Abstract-Remote authentication has been widely studied and adapted in distributed systems. The security of remote authentication mechanisms mostly relies on one of or the combination of three factors: 1) something users know-password; 2) something users have-smart card; and 3) something users are-biometric characteristics. This paper introduces an efficient generic framework for three-factor authentication. The proposed generic framework enhances the security of existing two-factor authentication schemes by upgrading them to threefactor authentication schemes, without exposing user privacy. In addition, we present a case study by upgrading a secure twofactor authentication scheme to a secure three-factor authentication scheme. Furthermore, implementation analysis, formal proof, and privacy discussion are provided to show that the derived scheme is practical, secure, and privacy preserving.
The earliest user authentication mechanism through the Internet is based on password. The concept of password based authentication was first proposed by Lamport in 1981 [4] . Such authentication systems remain the most common mechanism for internet applications (e.g. email services, conference management systems, and social networks). However, the security of such systems is not always reliable. For example, poor password selections, the password capture Trojans, and the reuse of passwords could break the security. One popular attack is called dictionary attack, which targets to find the correct password by trying a large amount of likely possibilities, such as words in a dictionary or the likely combination of words. This attack is usually efficient since most users prefer to choose human memorisable passwords, e.g. the user's name, address, or mobile number. A good remedy is additionally using hardware authentication tokens (usually smart cards) to authenticate clients. Such a remedy is called two factor authentication, which has become popular and has been used by applications with higher security guarantees, e.g. internet banking services. In 1991, Chang and Wu [5] introduced this idea of using password and smart card to authenticate clients. Afterwards, many two-factor authentication schemes have been proposed. However, the security of two factor authentication could be compromised since the smart card may be stolen and the data stored in the smart card can be duplicated, and the range of possible passwords could be small and users may forget or lose their passwords. Due to such concerns, biometric identification was introduced to authenticate users by using their biometric features.
In 1999, Juels and Watenberg [6] proposed a biometric authentication scheme, called "fuzzy commitment," that improves some aspects of two-factor authentication because biometric characteristics have higher entropy, and they cannot be forgotten and are rarely to be lost [7] . However, one problem is that biometric characteristics are not completely private since one can "steal" biometric characteristics from others; e.g., the fingerprint can be obtained from a mug that the victim has used, and the facial features may be obtained from a user's photograph. A way to alleviate these problems is to combine all these three factors together. This approach is also known as three-factor authentication, which has been greatly adapted by cloud-based applications (see [8] ).
A. Related Work
The introduction of password-based authentication by Lamport in 1981 [4] has inspired numerous password based authentication protocols [9] - [13] . In 1999, Yang and Shieh [9] proposed two two-factor authentication schemes: one is based on timestamp and the other is based on random nonce. Both of them support contact-less password changing, i.e., users do not need to contact/inform a server to change their password. A system satisfying such requirement can save the computation cost on the server side, and save the communication cost on both server and user side. Later, Chan and Cheng [14] , and Fan et al. [10] identified impersonation attacks on the Yang-Schieh scheme. To overcome this flaw, Shen, Lin and Hwang [11] , and Yang, Wang and Chang [12] suggested improvements on the Yang-Schieh scheme. However, Yoon et al. [13] showed possible attacks on the YWC-scheme [12] , and introduced an improvement. In 2006, however, Wang and Bao [15] pointed out that both the SLH-scheme [11] and Yoon et al.'s scheme [13] are vulnerable to impersonation attack.
On the other direction, in 2003, Kim et al. [16] proposed two constructions of three-factor authentication schemes by using password, smart card, and fingerprints, without requiring public key directory tables. However, Scott [17] pointed out that a passive eavesdropper, without accessing to any smart card, password, or fingerprint, could impersonate any identity to pass authentication after successfully eavesdropping only once legitimate log-in.
In 2004, Uludag et al. [18] surveyed various types of biometric authentication systems, and recommended to use digital rights management (DRM) systems [19] to address the problem of biometric authentication systems. In their method, the cryptographic key is bound with a biometric template and stored in a database. Thus, the key cannot be revealed without passing biometric authentication. However, the requirement of the biometric database has increased the cost and put users' privacy at risk. To protect users' privacy, in 2006 Bhargav-Spantze et al. [20] , [21] proposed a novel privacy preserving two-phase three-factor authentication scheme, based on zero knowledge proof (ZKP), in which user privacy is preserved by using the Pedersens commitments [22] . However, the scheme is expensive because of modular exponentiation operations, and the requirement that all users' commitments are stored on the server side. In 2009, Fan and Lin [23] constructed an efficiency enhancing and privacy preserving three-factor authentication scheme, but it does not support contact-less password changing. There are also many other research [24] , [25] have been done on preserving user privacy in distributed systems.
Recently, Li and Hwang [26] proposed an efficient three factor user authentication scheme, without requiring synchronized clocks. Later, Li et al. [27] pointed out that the Li-Huang scheme does not meet proper authentication since it is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. To address this shortcoming, they provided a further improvement. In 2011, however, Das et al. [28] found that Li et al.'s improved scheme neither provided strong authentication nor supported contactless password changing. They then proposed an improvement on Li et al.'s scheme. However, the improved scheme is still insecure as an adversary who obtained a victim's smart card can launch off-line password guessing attack.
To tackle the problem caused by insecure proposals and improvements, Huang et al. [29] proposed a generic framework to upgrade two factor authentication schemes to three-factor authentication schemes, while preserving security and privacy. The basic idea is to use a fuzzy extractor to generate the biometric key from the biometric characteristics, and run twice the underlying two-factor authentication scheme. The first run is the normal underlying two-factor scheme using passwords and smart cards. In the second run of the underlying scheme, the password is replaced with the generated biometric key. This framework does not require any change on the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, and in the derived scheme users do not need to hand their biometric characteristics over to the server, so that servers do not need to store any data related to user's biometric characteristics. Thus, user privacy is preserved and the cost on the server side is reduced.
B. Motivation
Huang et al. [29] offer a good framework to produce threefactor authentication schemes from existing two factor authentication schemes. This framework eases the design of three factor authentication systems, provides higher security guarantee, and preserves user privacy. To generate biometric keys from the biometric characteristics, Huang et al.'s framework employs the "fuzzy extractor" [30] . Fuzzy extractor generates a pair of strings (P, R) from user biometric characteristics, where P is the auxiliary string and R should be kept secret as private key. The private R can be recovered if a user can provide the corresponding auxiliary string P and a close enough biometric characteristics. The error tolerance in the scheme depends on three error correcting techniques, namely Hamming distance, set difference, and edit distance. The fuzzy extractor provides a good insight into biometric identification by extracting a unique and random 'private' key directly from the user's biometric features. However, the fuzzy extractor has not been widely implemented since the distance measures in it are less accepted than the Euclidean distance measurement in biometric applications [31] .
Moreover, we observe that the efficiency of Huang et al.'s framework can be improved from running underlying scheme twice to running it once -which saves almost half of the cost in total. Moreover, the study on the concrete three-factor authentication scheme with formally security analysis, which is recognised as an open problem and a challenging issue [32] , are missing in their work.
C. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are the improved generic framework for three-factor authentication and a provably secure instantiation. The merits of this paper are as follows.
First, the proposed generic framework enhances efficiency by combining the user's password and the user's biometric key together and using the hash value of this combination as the user's secret key. Consequently, the resulted three-factor scheme only needs to run the underlying two-factor scheme one time. This saves almost half of the communication cost and computation cost for each login among potential billions of users.
Second, the proposed generic framework is more practical. We employ the improved finger print-based "fuzzy vault" [33] to identify the user's biometric features. Literature shows that the fuzzy extractor has not been implemented yet, while researchers implemented and improved the fuzzy vault scheme in recent years [31] , [33] - [36] . Moreover, the fuzzy vault has been widely accepted because the Euclidean distance measurement which is used in the fuzzy vault are widely accepted by majority of biometric applications [31] . Therefore, the improved framework selects the fuzzy vault to employ the third factor, biometric features.
Last, a provably secure instantiation is presented. In particular, this paper discusses the practicability analysis of the concrete scheme, compares our concrete scheme with other existing three-factor schemes, provides privacy discussion, and shows formal security proof on the concrete scheme.
D. Organization
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews and discusses two well-known biometric identification mechanisms. Section III reviews Huang et al. ' s framework and provides an improved generic framework for three-factor authentication. The instantiation with analysis and comparison are given in Section IV. In section V, formal security proof and privacy discussion for this instantiation are provided.
II. BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION MECHANISMS
In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg [6] proposed "fuzzy commitment", the first biometric identification scheme, which deploys Hamming distance to tolerate errors. Later, Juels and Sudan [37] introduced a provably secure biometric identification scheme, called fuzzy vault, in which a user can generate a long-bit secret key, and encrypt it by using his/her extracted biometric template. The long-bit secret key can be recovered by providing the encrypted data and the corresponding authentic biometric characteristics. In 2003, Clancy et al. [34] proposed a secure smart card based fingerprint authentication scheme by using Juels and Sudan's fuzzy vault. Later, in 2007, Nandakumar et al. [35] proposed a fully automatic implementation by employing the fuzzy vault and using helper data to align unidentified fingerprints accurately. Their scheme used both location (x, y) and orientation attribute θ of a minutia point to record the biometric data, where (x, y) is the row and column indicators in the image as the location, and θ is the orientation on the X-axis. The helper data is high curvature points extracted from the fingerprint orientation field, thus it neither affects the security nor leaks any information about the biometric template. One year later, Nagar, Nandakumar and Jain [33] improved the security and matching accuracy of Nandakumar et al's fingerprint-based fuzzy vault scheme by employing additional minutiae descriptors [38] , which capture local ridge orientation and ridge frequency information in the neighbourhood of a minutia. The results in [33] show that the improved scheme reduces the false acceptance rate (FAR) and significantly increases the vault security.
On the other direction, in 2004, Dodis et al. [30] proposed fuzzy extractor, which has two procedures: a generation procedure and a reproduction procedure. After a user scanned his biometric features and obtained the biometric template w, the generation procedure extracts a random R and a corresponding auxiliary P from w. In the authentication phase, the inputs of reproduction procedure are P and an unidentified biometric template w ; the output of this reproduction procedure is exactly the same R if and only if the difference between w and w is within an acceptable error tolerance. In 2008, Teoh and Ong [39] proposed a randomised dynamic quantisation transformation (RDQT), which is based on fuzzy commitment, to binarize biometric data, and satisfy both randomness and uniqueness. Meanwhile, Sheng et al. [40] presented a template-free biometric-key generation, which can also generate a key directly from a biometric template.
A. Fuzzy Vault
Fuzzy vault is a cryptographic construction for data protection and user authentication, whose security relies on unexposed biometric characteristics and smart card. The error tolerance in fuzzy vault is achieved by using the Euclidean distance measurement which has been widely accepted by the majority of biometric applications. The operations of the fuzzy vault are described as follows.
First, a user extracts biometric template X by scanning her biometric characteristics (e.g. fingerprint). Then, she encodes a pre-self-generated secret string K into a self-selected polynomial Pol, and evaluates the polynomial on all elements in X. She also needs to choose a large number of random points which do not lie on Pol as the noise. The final vault V is the collection of the points which lie on Pol and the noise points which do not lie on Pol.
She can recover the secret string K from vault V by providing a biometric template X such that the difference between X and X satisfies |X − X | < , where X − X = {x|x ∈ X, x / ∈ X }, and is an integer which is the fuzziness parameter. This is because that the polynomial Pol can be reconstructed if a sufficient number of points on Pol can be identified. Thus, K can be successfully recovered from Pol. The detail operation is defined as follows:
1) Lock:
Taking input a user's biometric template X, secret K and polynomial Pol, Gen(·) outputs a set L of points which lie on the Pol.
Taking input L and a set C P of "chaff points" (i.e. random noise points) which do not lie on Pol, Enc(·) outputs a vault V such that V = C P ∪L. C P is generated on the user side, and if we denote r the number of points in L, and s the number of points in C P, then we require s r . 2) Unlock:
→ Pol: Taking input V and biometric template X , Dec(·) outputs Pol if and only if |X − X | < , where X − X = {x|x ∈ X, x / ∈ X } and is the fuzziness parameter.
The security of the fuzzy vault is based on the difficulty of distinguishing genuine points from chaff points in vault V , and the difficulty to reconstruct the polynomial Pol in vault V . So, the security guarantee is in proportion to the number of added chaff points.
III. A GENERIC THREE-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK

A. Review of Huang et al.'s Framework
Huang et al.'s framework employs the fuzzy extractor to generate a uniquely long-bit random string as the biometric key for users. By running the underlying two-factor scheme twice, a three-factor scheme is constructed. In particular, the first run uses password and smart card as normal two factor authentication system. In the second run, framework replaces the password by a biometric key and runs the underlying protocol again, thus a three-factor authentication is obtained. 
= (P, h(·), Rep(·)), where h(·) and Rep(·)
are the corresponding hash function and the reproduction procedure, respectively. The scheme supposes that PW 1 , PW 2 will be deleted immediately from the server side upon completion of the corresponding registration steps. This means that in the registration phase, the server is fully trusted.
2) Authentication: User U i first inserts SC into a card reader, enters her password, and scans her biometric features. We use X to denote the extracted biometric template. The authentication phase is as follows.
1) The smart card recovers R through Rep(·), and calculates PW 2 = h(R ). R = R if and only if |X − X | < for some fuzziness parameter ; Data 1 ) runs the authentication phase (2-Factor-Auth) of the underlying two-factor authentication protocol with server S;
; U i with PW 2 , Data 2 runs the 2-Factor-Auth with S. The user successfully passes user authentication if and only if both step 2 and step 3 succeeded.
3) Password Changing: The password can be changed by running password changing protocol (2-Factor-PasswordChanging) in the underlying two-factor scheme after successfully logging and updating the SC accordingly. The biometrics can be changed by running step 2 and step 3 in the registration phase, then the user and server execute 2-Factor-Password-Changing and update the corresponding data in SC.
B. Improved Framework
We assume that the server in the registration phase is trusted. The details are specified as follows:
1) Three-Factor-Registration: The processes of registration include the following steps: 1) User U i chooses an initial password PW 1 , a long-bit secret key PW 2 .
2) The fuzzy vault device extracts biometric template X by scanning her biometric features. 3) Taking X, PW 2 , and polynomial Pol as inputs, Gen(·) outputs a set L, and by taking the set C P of noise chaff points and L, the Ence(·) outputs the encrypted data V .
and || is concatenation operation. The user with PW and the server with SK run the registration phase of the underlying protocol. 5) Server stores Data 1 and
Dec(·), h(·)) in smart card SC, and gives it to U i . 2) Three-Factor-Authentication: To access services, user U i inserts SC to a card reader, which can extracts the data from the SC. Then, U i inputs PW 1 and scans her biometric features, the extracted biometric template is X . The details are as follows:
1) The card reader extracts X from U i 's biometric features, and reproduces PW 2 such that PW 2 = PW 2 if and only
The user can successfully pass authentication if and only if this step is success.
3) Three-Factor-Password-Changing: The PW 1 can be changed by following steps. 1) After passing authentication, U i sends the password changing request, inputs new password PW 1 , and scans the biometric template. 2) The 'fuzzy vault' device will recover the PW 2 by using the 'fuzzy vault' decoding scheme. 3) The smart card calculates PW = h(PW 1 ||PW 2 ). 4) PW is taken as the password and runs the password changing phase of the underlying protocol. Biometric key PW 2 can be changed in a similar way. For this purpose, U i chooses a new biometric key as PW 2 , then encrypts it via the fuzzy vault device, outputs V which replaces current V in SC. The SC calculates PW = h(PW 1 ||PW 2 ), then takes PW as the password and runs the password changing phase of the underlying protocol.
IV. INSTANTIATION
Our instantiation will use the Yang et al.'s two-factor authentication scheme [41] , which is provably secure, as the underlying scheme.
Let G be a group of prime order q and g a generator, H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k denote a collision resistant hash function, H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k a hash function which preserves the entropy of its input (e.g. add paddings after the input); P RF K : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k a pseudo-random function keyed by K. In addition, we assume that a server S has a long term secret x such that x ∈ {0, 1} k , and encryption and signature key pairs (P K, SK ) and (P K , SK ), respectively.
Let E P K (M) denotes the asymmetric key encryption on message M under public key P K ; Sig S K (M) a signature on M issued by using signing key SK .
A. Review of Yang et al.'s Scheme
In the registration phase, a user U i chooses a unique identity I D i and sends it to the server S. After receiving the request, S issues a credential C i = P RF x (H (I D i )), and hides it by calculating B = C i ⊕ H (PW 0 ), where PW 0 is the initial password chosen by S; then S sends the initial password PW 0 and a smart card which contains
The login phase is presented in the Fig. 1 . To log in, U i attaches her smart card to a card reader device, and enters her password PW . The smart card calculates C i = B ⊕ H (PW ) and sends (I D i , si d, g a ) to S, where si d is the session identifier, and a is a new selected random number. S should send
where S I D is the identity of S and the signature is used for server side authentication. If the signature is valid, then U i believes that he is talking to the real server, and sends (I D i , si d, CT ) to S, where CT = E P K (C i , I D i ,  S I D, si d, g a , g b )) . S accepts U i as a genuine user if (H (I D i ) ). Now both parties believe that they have shared the same session key g ab .
In addition, U i can change her password at anytime after she receiving the smart card and initial password PW 0 from S. 
B. Protocol
The basic idea of our concrete protocol is that using PW = H (PW 1 ||PW 2 ) as the password in Yang et al's scheme, where PW 1 is the real password, and PW 2 is the biometric key encrypted through fuzzy vault scheme. A user can pass authentication only if s/he provides the correct password, smart card, and the biometric features which is close enough with the one used in the registration phase. The biometric key PW 2 and the biometric features can be changed in a similar way, in which case, the vault V in the smart card should also be updated.
C. Analysis of Implementation
To analyze the derived three-factor authentication scheme, we take the fingerprint based fuzzy vault scheme [35] proposed by Nandakumar, Jain, and Pankanti in 2007, though any secure biometrics authentication protocol can be used. In their fuzzy vault scheme, each element v i ∈ V (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r + s}) is represented as three-tuple such that v i = (x, y, θ) , where r is the number of points in L (w.r.t. the points in V which lie on P) and s denotes the number of noise points in V which do not lie on P, (x, y) is the row and column coordinates in the image showing the location, θ is the orientation which respect to the X-axis.
In addition, we take s ≈ 10r to satisfy the requirement that s r . Moreover, 8-degree polynomial is used to encrypt 128-bit secrets, and the lengths of x, y, θ (quantized and represented in bit strings) are 6, 5, 5, respectively. As the parameter showed in [35] , there are around 30 points which lie on the selected polynomial in a 640×480 at 500 dpi resolution fingerprint image, so we could conclude r = 30 and s = 300. Thus, V contains 330 points which requires 660 Bytes space. Furthermore, the length of help data used in this fuzzy vault scheme is depended on the points of maximum curvature in the flow curves, and it can be ignored. Thus, only less than 1 KB additional data are required if compared with the underlying two factor authentication scheme.
The genuine acceptance rate (GAR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) are influenced by the degree of polynomial. In the above setting, the FAR falls in 0.01% − 0.04% and GAR is grater than 90%. In fact, GAR is acceptable even if G AR = 50%, as this means that genuine users can pass authentication by scanning their fingerprint about twice.
We compare our instantiation with other schemes into two tables, namely Table I and Table II [28] , and Kim-Lee-Yoo scheme [16] support contactless password changing, and the first three schemes only have very small computation cost. However, all of them have security flaws. In contrast, both Bhargav-Spantze et al.'s scheme [21] and Fan-Lin scheme [23] are secure under the three-factor adversary model, but they do not support contactless password changing and Bhargav-Spantze et al.'s scheme does not support session key establishment, so perfect forward secret cannot been guaranteed. While the derived protocol protects user privacy, offers contactless password changing, and supports session key establishment, with acceptable computation cost.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The hypothesis of the security of our proposed generic framework is that (A) the underlying two-factor authentication protocol is secure when any one factor is compromised, and (B) the fuzzy vault system is secure when the biometric template is kept secret. In a system derived by using our framework, the authentication process is actually the same as the underlying two-factor authentication protocol. However, the difference is that, the "password" PW = h(PW 1 ||PW 2 ) is the output of a hash function, where the input data are the human memorisable password PW 1 , and the secret bitstring PW 2 which is protected by using the fuzzy vault system. Considering three different cases: the PW 1 and the biometric template are exposed to the attacker, the PW 1 and the smart card are exposed to the attacker, and the biometric template and the smart card are exposed to the attacker.
To make the analysis easier to be understood, we assume a very strong attacker, who can recover PW 2 if the biometric template is compromised, though actually the attacker also needs the information stored in the smart card. However, this assumption will not affect our security since if the system is secure against a very strong attacker, then the system is also secure against a weak attacker.
Loosely speaking, if the PW 1 and biometric template (so the PW 2 ) are compromised, then it is the similar case as that in the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, the password is corrupted while the smart card remains secure (since PW can be computed in this case). So the derived system will remain secure. Otherwise, we can build a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) Turing machine to break the security of the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, which contradicts to the hypothesis (A).
If the case that PW 1 and the smart card are compromised, we have that PW 2 is secure thanks to the hypothesis (B). In addition, by hypothesis (A), we have that the system is secure if PW remains secure. So, the only way the attacker can pass the authentication is to discover the value of PW. If there is a way to discover the value of PW with overwhelming probability, then we can either construct a PPT Turing machine that is able to discover the value of the password in the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, which is a contradiction of hypothesis (A); or we can find the hash collision which contradicts to the assumption of a secure hash function. The case that the biometric template and smart card are composed is similar to this case. Now, we present the formal security analysis of the instantiation given in Section IV.
Considering two communicating parties A and B, a mutual authentication protocol is secure if and only if participant A accepting participant B implies B accepting A. The generic security model of mutual authentication have been well studied [42] - [44] ; however, more strict security model is desired for the three-factor authentication systems due to the more intricate authentication conditions. Currently, the formal security analysis of multiple factor authentication scheme remains as a challenging issue [32] , although there are some existing works [23] , [45] , [46] . This section proposes a security model for three-factor authenticated key exchange schemes by extending and adopting the existing generic model [42] . Based on the proposed model, we prove the security of the derived scheme.
A. Security Model
We place probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A between user U i in user set U and sever S j in server set S. 1) We say that K is a matching conversation to K if there
) be the oracle which acts as user U i (resp. server S j ) communicating with server S j (resp. user
has not engaged in a matching conversation. In other words, it is the event that user U i (resp. server S j ) believes that server S j (resp. user U i ) is communicating with him, but in fact, it is the adversary A who has impersonated server S j (resp. user U i ).
Remark 2: The above definition is defined for the case of R = 2ρ−1. The case of R = 2ρ is similar and we omit it here.
Definition 2 (Secure Three-Factor Mutual Authentication (ST M A)):
We say that is a secure mutual authentication protocol if the following properties are satisfied in presence of PPT adversary A defined in the adversary model. accepted each other and no session key reveal query has been made to
is the probability such that A has won in the T est (U i , S j , si d) .
B. Formal Security Analysis
To prove the security of our concrete scheme, we shall show that if A can successfully pass user or server authentication with a non-negligible probability, then we can construct a PPT Turing machine T to solve the underlying hard problem under the help of A with a non-negligible probability. The concrete protocol is reviewed as follows: D i ) ). Now, the shared session key is g ab . Lemma 1 (Secure User Authentication): In the proposed protocol , if the pseudo-random function (PRF) is replaced by an ideal random function, the public key encryption scheme is secure against CCA2 attack, and sid S j ,U i has accepted, then the probability of No − Matchi ng A,S j (k) is negligible even in presence of PPT adversary A in the adversary model.
pass user authentication if and only if C i = P RF x (H (I
Proof: This can be proved by contradiction. If there exists an adversary A who can pass user authentication with non-negligible probability , then we can construct a PPT Turing machine T to solve the underlying hard problem without knowing secret key x, i.e. winning the game of P RF (Game-PRF), with a non-negligible probability by using A.
Let's assume that P RF is an ideal random function. The Game-PRF is defined as follows: there are two participants, a challenger and a PRF oracle P RF which has the secret x. The challenger has the power to ask P RF for the P RF x (M) of any message M as many times as she wants. The game is that this challenger sends two different plaintexts P 0 and P 1 to the P RF oracle, which will output P RF x (P b ) to the challenger, where P 0 and P 1 The basic idea is that to win Game-PRF, T simulates an environment of our concrete protocol to convince adversary A that this simulation is the real environment of concrete protocol execution. On the other side, A should only has a negligible probability to know the truth, i.e. this is not a real protocol environment but a simulation. In such a simulation, T communicates with A who has the ability to break our concrete protocol in some way in a session with session ID si d with a non-negligible probability. Then, in order to win Game-PRF, T will make use of A's ability to make the decision of which input message has been used to generate the output P RF x (P b ) with a non-negligible probability.
The simulation is constructed as follows. In the simulation, T answers all oracle queries made by A. To achieve this goal, T needs to setup (SK, P K ) for the public key scheme and (SK , P K ) for the signature scheme, while T does not know the value of long term secret key x which is for P RF . , f actor a , f actor b ) to obtain two factors, then sends the first message to T who then responds with the second message. Finally, A forms the third message to T . Now, we show how T makes use of A to win Game-PRF with non-negligible advantage as follows. We assume that A attacks at least once among q s sessions, while T does not know which session A is going to attack. Now, T chooses a session out of q s sessions randomly. Then, the probability of A passing user authentication in this session is 1 q s · . To avoid the case that A found that this environment is only a simulation, in the rest q s − 1 sessions, T redirects the identity I D r , which is included in the first message, to oracle P RF which will respond P RF x (I D r ) back to T . Then, T records this identity into the compromised table and checks whether A has passed the user authentication by matching P RF x (I D r ) with the credential which is encrypted in the third message. If they are matched, then T responds to A that T accepts A's login request. Otherwise, T rejects A's request. For these sessions, T just randomly guesses the value of b, so the probability that T wins the game is 1 2 .
To use A, after receiving first message
by using SK and sends it to A. If A can successfully pass user authentication, s/he must be able to forge third message M 3 = (I D new , si d, CT ) , where CT = E P K (C new , I D new , S I D, si d, g a , g b ) . Now, T requires to start the Game-PRF by choosing two distinct messages y 0 = H (I D new ) and y 1 = R 1 , and sends (y 0 , y 1 ) to the P RF test query. The query responds P RF x (y b ) to T , then T decrypts CT to recover C new and checks whether the response is the same as C new . If it is, then it outputs b = 0 as the guessed result of b. Otherwise, it outputs b = 1.
We now analyze the probability of game winning. We assume that A forges user U new , and passes user authentication successfully in polynomial time τ, with non-negligible probability , after asking q R times Regi ster ( , S j ), q E times E xecute(U i , S j , si d), q S times send query in q s sessions. The formula of calculating probability Pr adv [P RF] of three different corrupting cases should be the same but with different because we do not care how A can pass the user authentication. If A does not select this special session, the probability of game wining without the help of A is 1 2 . Otherwise, if A indeed attacks this special session chose by T , then the probability is concerned as follows. The probability of A pass authentication is , so the probability that we win the Game-PRF is ( · 1 + (1 − ) · 1 2 ). Because if A has passed authentication, then we have 100% probability to win the game. However, A may fail with the probability of (1 − ), in this case, we have 1 2 probability to win the game. Thus,
It is clear that Pr adv [P RF] is non-negligible since is non-negligible, and T spends τ = τ + τ 2 time to win games, where τ 2 is the executing time of T interaction with the test query. It is obvious that both τ and τ 2 are polynomial times, thus, τ is also a polynomial time. Therefore, T can win Game-PRF with non-negligible advantage Pr adv [ In Game-UFCMA, there is a signature signing oracle Sign . A challenger who has P K can make signing queries on messages, and can also verify the signature by using P K . To win the game, the challenger needs to output a fresh message M new with valid signature on it. Let Pr win [S I G] be the probability of the advantage of game winning.
The basic idea is that to win Game-UFCMA, T simulates an environment of our concrete protocol to convince adversary A that this simulation is the real concrete protocol. In addition, A should only have a negligible probability to know the truce, i.e. this is not a real protocol environment but a simulation. In such simulation, T communicates with A who has the ability to successfully forge server's signature in a session with session ID si d with a non-negligible probability. Then, T will make use of A's ability to win Game-UFCMA with a non-negligible probability.
To use A, T needs to simulate A's view as follows. In the simulation, T answers all oracle queries made by A. To achieve this goal, T needs to setup all parameters except signing key SK . In our concrete scheme, A can ask following quires: (S I D, T, si d, g a , g b ) ) and send it to T .
To win the Game-UFCMA with A's help, T sends M = (S I D, T, si d, g a , g b ) together with the signature in M 2 to the test query. We assume that A forges server S and passes server authentication successfully in polynomial time τ , with non-negligible probability , asking q E times to E xecute(U i , S j , si d) and q S times to send a query, which contains q s times Send(S j , U i , si d, M m , m ). Let η be the probability of T winning Game-UFCMA when A has failed to pass server authentication. The probability is analysed as follows. In q s times send query made by A, we choose one query to help us to answer the Game-UFCMA. The probability of A pass sever authentication is , so the probability of we win the Game-UFCMA is ( · 1 + (1 − ) · η). Because that if A has passed authentication, then we have 100% probability to win the game. On the other side, A may also failed with the probability of (1 − ), in this case, we have the probability of η to win the game. For the rest queries, the probability of game wining without the help of A is η. Thus,
It is clear that Pr win [S I G] is non-negligible since is non-negligible and η is negligible. The time T spent to win the games is τ = τ + τ 3 , where t 3 is the executing time of T spends in GAME-UFCMA. τ is a polynomial time because both τ and τ 3 are polynomial times. Therefore, we can construct PPT machine T to win Game-UFCMA of the signature scheme, with non-negligible probability, and this is a contradiction. Proof: Obviously, the first condition of Definition 2 holds because it is easy to verify that our concrete protocol is correct. In addition, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the second and third conditions of Definition 2 also hold. Therefore, Theorem 1 holds.
Theorem 2 (Secure Three-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange (ST AK E)): In proposed protocol , if (A) the P RF is replaced by an ideal random function and the P K E scheme is secure against CC A2 attack; (B) the signature scheme is unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack; then for any PPT adversary A in the adversary model, the advantage Adv A (k) of A winning the game of AK E P in a fresh session is negligible.
Proof: According to the Definition 3, ST AK E needs to meet three conditions. The first condition is that protocol is required to satisfies ST M A. This condition is achieved because Theorem 1. The second condition is that for a fresh session in protocol , if complete conversations are matched, then the same session key must be shared between these two communicating parties. This condition is achieved because that in our concrete scheme, the key exchange is the plain two-move Diffie-Hellman protocol [43] , and this condition is a well-known property and it was proved. For the third condition, the advantage Adv A (k) = | Pr[Gguess A (k)] − 1 2 | is non-negligible due to [43] . Thus, is a secure three-factor authenticated key exchange protocol.
C. Privacy Discussion
The proposed framework preserves user privacy due to the following reasons. First, the server does not know any information about the user's biometric template since the user does not need to provide biometric templates to the server. Second, the data stored in SC will not leak biometric information since V contains a large amount of noise. Thus, the probability of successful recovering the biometric template is negligible due to [35] . Moreover, the helper data H which is required in the fingerprint based fuzzy vault scheme are global features, and two very different fingerprint can have very similar helper data. So, H also will not leak biometric characteristics [35] .
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed framework can systematically and efficiently upgrade two-factor authentication schemes to three-factor authentication schemes. The derived scheme protects user's privacy, and enhances security. In addition, we made a case study by applying the framework on an existing two factor authentication scheme [41] . Our analysis, discussion, and formal proof show that the resulted three-factor protocol achieves higher security guarantee and preserves user privacy.
